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DEEPWATER HORIZON NATURAL RESOURCE 
DAMAGES ASSESSMENT: WHERE DOES THE 
MONEY GO? 
Nicholas J. Lund* and Niki L. Pace** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The effort to assess and remediate the environmental effects of the 
Deepwater Horizon Spill (the Spill) began while the oil was still gushing 
and will continue for many years.  Recognizing that the Spill would 
cause profound damage to both the Gulf’s natural resources and to the 
livelihoods of Gulf residents who depend on those natural resources, the 
federal government undertook a natural resource damage assessment 
(NRDA) just weeks after the Spill began.1   
                                            
 * Nicholas J. Lund is the Ocean and Coastal Law Fellow at the National Sea Grant 
Law Center at the University of Mississippi.  He received his J.D. at the University of 
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NA09OAR4170200 from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
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NOAA or the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 ** Niki L. Pace is a Research Counsel with the Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Legal 
Program and Adjunct Professor at the University of Mississippi School of Law.  She 
received her J.D and L.L.M. in Environmental and Natural Resources Law from Lewis & 
Clark Law School. This research was funded under award number NA10OAR4170078 
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of 
Commerce.  The statements, findings, conclusions, and recommendations are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of NOAA or the U.S. Department of 
Commerce. 
 1. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)’s Damage 
Assessment Remediation and Restoration Program (DARP) began the Preliminary 
Assessment Phase of the NRDA on April 20, 2010.  NRDA By The Numbers, NAT’L 
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2010/12/FINAL-NRDA-by-the-Numbers-for-12-1-10.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2011). 
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The idea behind natural resource damage provisions is for the 
responsible party to do what is necessary to make the environment 
“whole” again, as if the accident never happened.2  In what is certain to 
be the largest NRDA undertaken under any statute, the task of making 
the Gulf “whole again” will last long after outrage sparked by the Spill 
has faded from the public mind.  Although it will take a long time, it will 
be important to follow the Deepwater Horizon NRDA process through to 
its completion to ensure the damaged natural resources are cared for.   
This Article examines the last phases of the NRDA process outlined 
in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).3  After the initial, comprehensive 
Preassessment phase, NRDA Trustees are responsible for developing a 
Restoration Plan, collecting money from the responsible parties, and 
finally, implementing restoration projects.  This Article explores the 
requirements and experiences of the money collection and restoration 
implementation phases of an OPA NRDA and discusses some of the 
controversies and uncertainties involved in the collection and distribution 
of restoration money. 
II.  NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES 
The idea that natural resources themselves had value and, if harmed, 
damages could be recovered for that harm in court was not popular until 
the environmental movement of the early 1970s. Since then, natural 
resource damage provisions have expanded in scope, and increased in 
use, becoming an important part of five federal environmental statutes.4  
Because fundamental similarities exist in all NRDA provisions, 
following the development of NRDAs from their inception helps frame 
their intent and direction. 
                                            
 2. 15 C.F.R. § 990.10 (2010); see also Barry Breen, Citizen Suits for Natural 
Resource Damages: Closing a Gap in Federal Environmental Law, 24 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 851, 853 (1989) (comparing the natural resource damage doctrine to tort law, which 
seeks to make the victim “whole” again). 
 3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2010). 
 4. Currently, the Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA), the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
(OPA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), National Marine Sanctuary Act, and the Park System Resource Protection 
Act offer NRD recovery.  CAROL E. DINKINS, NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES LITIGATION 
1-5 (2010). 
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A.  The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act 
The idea of a public cause of action for injury to natural resources—
making the polluters pay for their harm—began with the bloom of 
landmark environmental legislation in the early 1970s.  Its earliest roots 
are found in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 
(TAPAA), which held pipeline right-of-way holders “strictly liable to all 
damaged parties . . . without regard to ownership of any affected lands, 
structures, fish, wildlife, or biotic or other natural resources relied upon 
by Alaska Natives, Native organizations, or others for subsistence or 
economic purposes.”5  TAPAA also held transporters of oil liable “for all 
damages, including clean-up costs, sustained by any person or entity, 
public or private.”6   
Though TAPAA was not a pure natural resource damage cause of 
action because it emphasized the recovery of economic damages, 
TAPAA did establish a framework for natural resource damage recovery 
that would become a staple in later iterations.   For instance, the statute 
mandated interim payments, requiring the responsible party to “provide 
emergency subsistence and other aid to an affected Alaska Native, 
Native organization, or other person pending expeditious filing of, and 
determination of, a claim.”7  Additionally, TAPAA established a 
Liability Fund (Fund) to pay for clean-up costs while liability was being 
determined.8  The Fund was originally paid for by a small tax on oil 
pumped into tanker ships.9  Such funds would be a staple of later NRD 
provisions. 
Under TAPAA, injured parties would simply submit a claim 
containing the circumstances of their injury, a list of the damages, an 
accounting of the damages incurred and proof of property ownership to 
the Fund.10  Unlike subsequent NRD provisions, the valuation of 
damaged natural resources —a tricky problem even today—was left to 
the victim rather than a government representative acting as a trustee.  
From there, the Fund’s representatives would present the claim to the 
responsible party, who could then settle with the injured party or dispute 
a claim and submit to arbitration.11  TAPAA did not include an explicit 
                                            
 5. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a) (1982); see also Breen, supra note 2, at 855. 
 6. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153(c)(1), 87 Stat. 567, 
586 (1973); see also Breen, supra note 2, at 855. 
 7. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(4). 
 8. 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2010). 
 9. Pub. L. No. 93-153(c)(5) (Title II), 87 Stat. at 587. 
 10. 43 C.F.R. § 29.9(a)-(b) (1977). 
 11. Id. § 29.9(c)(1), 29.9(h). 
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requirement that sums requested for the loss of natural resources be used 
to recover those natural resources, which is included in later NRD 
provisions. 
B.  The Deepwater Port Act of 1974 
The cause of action for the recovery for natural resource damages 
was expanded in its next appearance, the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 
(DPA).12  The DPA created liability for damages “suffered by any 
person, or involving . . . the natural resources of the marine environment, 
or the coastal environment.”13  Congress was up front about its desire to 
protect the natural resources themselves, stating that the purpose behind 
the statute was to “provide for the protection of the marine and coastal 
environment to prevent or minimize any adverse impact which might 
occur as a consequence of the development of [deepwater] ports.”14   
The DPA emphasized its environmental awareness and separated 
itself from TAPAA in a few ways.  First, it separated “damages” from 
“cleanup costs,” allowing recovery for “damages . . . suffered by . . . the 
natural resources of the marine environment, or the coastal environment 
of any nation” in addition to the actual costs of cleaning up the spill.15  
Second, the DPA allowed a public official to act as a trustee on behalf of 
the public in order to recover natural resource damages, and specified 
that those damages could only be “applied to the restoration and 
rehabilitation of such natural resources by the appropriate agencies of 
Federal or State government.”16  This burgeoning recognition that the 
environment itself—not just human reliance on it—had worth, paved the 
way for all subsequent natural resource damages provisions. 
C.  The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“Clean Water Act”) 
Congress seized the opportunity to expand upon the DPA’s 
somewhat limited scope in crafting amendments to the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, creating the Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA).  
Following the DPA’s lead, the CWA expanded polluters’ liability to 
include natural resource damages, permitting trustees to recover “any 
                                            
 12. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1976). 
 13. Id. § 1517(m)(2); see also Breen, supra note 2, at 856. 
 14. Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-627(2)(a)(2), 88 Stat. 2126, 2126 (1975). 
 15. Id. at 93-627, § 18(m)(2), 88 Stat. 2145 (1975).  
 16. Id. at 93-627, § 18(i)(3), 88 Stat. 2144 (1975); see also Breen, supra note 2, at 
856. 
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costs or expenses incurred by the Federal Government or any State 
government in the restoration or replacement of natural resources 
damaged or destroyed as a result of . . . oil or a hazardous substance” 
spilled into navigable waters.17 
The CWA amendments also installed the requirement that “[s]ums 
recovered shall be used to restore, rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent 
of such natural resources by the appropriate agencies of the Federal 
Government, or the State government.”18  This provision is noteworthy 
not only because it requires recovered sums to be used solely for natural 
resource restoration, but because it allows states as well as the Federal 
government to serve as trustees and bring lawsuits. 
D.  The Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) 
Enacted in 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund) is the closest 
blueprint for the statutory scheme being used for the Deepwater Horizon 
Spill NRDA.  CERCLA expanded the reach of NRD statutes far beyond 
oil spills, establishing liability for “injury to, destruction of, or loss of 
natural resources” resulting from the release of hazardous substances.19  
CERCLA lists more than 800 chemicals as hazardous if released.20  
Further, CERCLA included a broader definition of “natural resources” 
than previous laws, extending liability to injury to “land, fish, wildlife, 
biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such 
resources” belonging to or controlled by the United States.21  Following 
the lead of the CWA, CERCLA limits NRD recoveries to the cost of 
“restoration, rehabilitation, or replacement or acquiring the equivalent of 
any natural resources injured.”22  The resulting statute “provides the most 
extensive legal framework for NRD recoveries”23 and has “virtually 
dominated environmental law since its enactment.”24 
                                            
 17. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4) (2006); see also Laura Rowley, NRD Trustees: To What 
Extent Are They Truly Trustees?, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 459, 461 (2001). 
 18. 33. U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) (2006). 
 19. Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(4)(C) (2006). 
 20. CERCLA Hazardous Substances, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/hazsubs/cercsubs.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16). 
 22. Id. § 9611(c)(2). 
 23. Rowley, supra note 17, at 463. 
 24. Breen, supra note 2, at 860. 
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In addition to greatly expanding the scope of natural resource 
damage recovery, CERCLA expanded and clarified a NRDA’s final 
phase: the implementation of restoration projects and the recovery of the 
environment.  The Department of the Interior (DOI), responsible for 
implementing CERCLA, breaks the NRDA process into three stages: 
Preassessment (which contains a Preassessment Screen step, sometimes 
considered a separate stage), Assessment, and Post-Assessment.25  
During the Preassessment stage, federal or state trustees (in the model 
pioneered by the DPA) first conduct a Preassessment Screen consisting 
of a “rapid review of readily available information” to determine whether 
or not a NRDA is required.26  If the screen is resolved in the positive, the 
next step in the Preassessment phase is “notification, coordination and 
emergency activities.”27 
The DOI provides two paths for the next phase, Assessment, 
depending on the severity of the spill or release.  Type A assessments 
regulate procedures for “simplified assessments requiring minimal field 
observation to determine damages.”28  Type B assessments are intended 
for larger, more complex spills where a determination of “the type and 
extent of short- and long-term injury and damages” is necessary.29  
Reflecting the complexity of the event these assessments are employed 
for, Type B assessments themselves are split into three parts: Injury 
Determination, Quantification, and Damage Determination.30 
The Injury Determination phase serves to establish the harm and 
determine causation to the responsible party.31  The Quantification phase, 
a more technical step, seeks to identify the extent of the loss of the 
resource’s services, and provides guidelines for “establishing baseline 
conditions, estimating recovery periods, and measuring the degree of 
service reduction stemming from an injury to a natural resource.”32  
Finally, the Damage Determination phase tackles the difficult job of 
assigning a dollar value to the injuries established in the Quantification 
                                            
 25. 43 C.F.R. § 11.13(b)-(f) (2010).  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s 
NRDA website considers DOI’s regulations, including the Preassessment Screen, as its 
own step.  Natural Resource Damage Assessment, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/nrd/nrda2.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). 
 26. 43 C.F.R. § 11.13(b) (2010). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. § 11.14(ss). 
 29. Id. § 11.14(tt). 
 30. Id. § 11.13(e)(1)-(3). 
 31. Id. § 11.13(e)(1). 
 32. Id. § 11.13(e)(2). 
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phase.33  This type of natural resource valuation is one of the most 
controversial and oft-discussed aspects of the NRDA process in any 
statute.34 
The final phase, Post-Assessment, covers the collection of money 
from the responsible party and the processes of putting those sums 
towards the restoration of the environment.  This phase begins with the 
trustee creating a Report of Assessment detailing Assessment 
information and, if using a Type B Assessment, detailed information 
regarding the Injury Determination, Quantification, and Damage 
Determination steps.35  Next, the trustee presents the potentially 
responsible party (PRP) with a written demand for the determined 
damages.36  The trustee’s assessment has the force of a rebuttable 
presumption, challengeable by the PRP in an administrative hearing.37  
The PRP has sixty days to acknowledge receipt before the trustees can 
file suit.38 
Once sums are recovered, they are placed into an account used solely 
for that purpose.39  Finally, after the natural resources damages claim 
amount is determined, the trustee must write a Restoration Plan outlining 
“how the monies will be used to address natural resources, specifically 
                                            
 33. Id. § 11.13(e)(3). 
 34. See, e.g., Melissa Daigle, The Value of a Pelican: An Overview of the Natural 
Resource Damage Assessment Under Federal Law and Louisiana Law, 16 OCEAN & 
COASTAL L.J. 253 (2011); Ronald M. Pierce, Valuing the Environment: NOAA’s New 
Regulations Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 167 (1994); Susan A. 
Austin, The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Proposed Rules for 
Natural Resource Damage Assessment Under the Oil Pollution Act, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 549 (1994).  The original version of CERCLA came under fire for undervaluing 
natural resources, requiring trustees to limit natural resource damages to the “lesser of (1) 
the cost of restoring or replacing the equivalent of the injured resource or (2) the lost use 
value of the resource.”  Gina M. Lambert & Anthony R. Chase, Remedying CERCLA’s 
Natural Resource Damages Provision: Incorporation of the Public Trust Doctrine Into 
Natural Resource Damage Actions, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 353, 361 (1992).  The Supreme 
Court found that this “lesser-of” rule was impermissible, determining that Congress 
intended the DOI to use restoration costs  as the measure of recovery.  Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 444-59 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  DOI regulations now include more 
guidance for natural resource valuation.  See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83 (2010). 
 35. 43 C.F.R. § 11.90 (2010). 
 36. Id.  § 11.91(a). 
 37. Id.  § 11.91(c). 
 38. Id.  § 11.91(d). 
 39. Id. § 11.92(a).  The account lies within the U.S. Treasury when the Federal 
government is the trustee, and in the State treasury where a state is the trustee.  Id. § 
11.92(a)(1)-(2). 
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what restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition of equivalent 
resources will occur.”40 
CERCLA laid the groundwork for modern NRD recoveries, and for 
the first time contemplated restorations for events on the scale of the 
Exxon-Valdez Spill and the Deepwater Horizon Spill.  CERCLA 
specifically excluded oil from its list of hazardous substances, with 
authority for that substance landing first with the CWA and then, spurred 
by the Exxon-Valdez Spill, with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.41  The 
OPA’s NRDA provisions are very similar to those developed for 
CERCLA, and it is under the OPA that federal and state officials are 
conducting the NRDA for the Deepwater Horizon Spill.  
III.  PRELIMINARY PHASES OF NRDA IN THE OIL POLLUTION ACT  
OF 1990 
As mentioned previously, OPA’s NRDA provisions are similar in 
most respects to those of the CWA and CERCLA.  As with those 
statutes, the OPA permits authorized representatives of Indian tribes and 
of federal, state, or foreign governments to act as trustees of natural 
resources.42  The OPA builds upon the CWA and CERCLA, though, in 
allowing the coordination of two or more trustees and permitting the 
designation of a “Lead Administrative Trustee.”43  The OPA also 
establishes a liability fund, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Fund), to 
handle immediate clean-up costs and NRD assessment costs.44   
                                            
 40. Id. § 11.93(a). 
 41. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2010)). 
 42. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(1) (2010).  The Federal Government’s trustees for the 
Deepwater Horizon Spill are NOAA, DOI, and the Department of Defense.  Resource 
Restoration Planning Process Begins for BP/Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 
RESTORETHEGULF.GOV (Sept. 29, 2010, 2:13 PM), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/ 
2010/09/29/resource-restoration-planning-process-begins-bpdeepwater-horizon-oil-spill. 
The state trustees are: the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources 
and the Geological Survey of Alabama; the Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection; the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality; the Louisiana 
Department of Environment of Wildlife and Fisheries, the Louisiana Department of 
Natural Resources, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, the Louisiana 
Oil Spill Coordinator’s Office, and the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration 
Authority; and, the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality, and the Texas General Land Office.  Id.    
 43. 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(a)(1) (2010); Kevin R. Murray et al., Natural Resource 
Damage Trustees: Whose Side Are They Really On?, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 407, 417 (1999). 
 44. 26 U.S.C.A. § 9509 (2010).  The Fund is stocked by an environmental fee on 
petroleum as well as by provisions of the OPA, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 
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The OPA holds polluters liable for clean-up costs and an array of 
damages resulting from the spill of oil.  All removal costs incurred by the 
U.S., a state or an Indian tribe are covered, as are removal costs taken by 
any person that are consistent with the National Contingency Plan.45  The 
OPA defines “damages” to include injury to natural resources; real or 
personal property; subsistence use; revenues; profits and earning 
capacity; and public services.46  The OPA sets a cap of $75 million on 
liability for offshore facilities like the Deepwater Horizon rig, but BP 
agreed to waive that cap voluntarily as the scale of the spill was 
recognized.47  Additionally, BP set up a $20 billion fund using the OPA’s 
interims-claims process to handle individual spill damages claims, 
leaving the NRDA collection to the trustees.48  
While the DOI is responsible for implementing CERCLA, the OPA 
requires regulations for oil spill NRDAs to be crafted by the Commerce 
Department’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA).49  Again taking cues from CERCLA, NOAA’s regulations 
separate the OPA’s NRDA process into three distinct steps: 
Preassessment, Restoration Planning, and Restoration Implementation.50  
A.  Preassessment 
The purpose of the Preassessment phase is to “provide a process by 
which trustees determine if they have jurisdiction to pursue restoration 
                                                                                                  
the DPA, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA) and the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments.  Id. § 9509(b).  Note that the OPA deviates 
from CERCLA here, which does not allow NRD assessment costs to be reimbursed by 
Superfund.  42 U.S.C. § 9611(b)(2) (2006); Murray, supra note 41, at 416-17. 
 45. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1) (2006).  The National Contingency Plan, officially known 
as The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, was created 
in 1968 as a blueprint for responding to oil spills and hazardous substance releases.  
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan Overview, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/lawsregs/ncpover.htm 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2011).  
 46. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2) (2006). 
 47. Id. § 2704(a)(3); Tom Hals, BP Tells Court It Waives Cap On Spill Liability, 
REUTERS, Oct. 19, 2010, available at  
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1911373420101019. 
 48. Laurel Brubaker Calkins & Margaret Cronin Fisk, BP’s $20 Billion Fund May Not 
Stop Spill Lawsuits, Judge Says, BLOOMBERG, June 18, 2010, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-17/bp-s-20-billion-fund-may-not-stop-spill-
lawsuits-new-orleans-judge-says.html. 
 49. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(1) (2006). 
 50. 15 C.F.R. § 990.12 (2010). 
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under OPA and, if so, whether it is appropriate to do so.”51  Trustees 
begin the formal process by determining whether an incident has 
occurred that threatens natural resources under the trusteeship of the 
trustees.52  If it is determined that the incident will cause injuries and that 
response actions will adequately address the injuries, trustees prepare a 
Notice of Intent to Conduct Restoration Planning and release it to the 
public and to potentially responsible parties.53  Reflecting the emphasis 
on transparency and public participation in the OPA, the administrative 
record amassed by the trustees is made available to the public to 
document the basis for the decision to proceed with a NRDA.54 
B.  Restoration Planning 
Restoration Planning is the most difficult and time-consuming aspect 
of an OPA NRDA.  It provides a process for trustees to “evaluate and 
quantify potential injuries . . . and use that information to determine the 
need for and scale of restoration actions.”55  After the formal steps of 
identifying the nature of the injury and establishing the causation 
between the release of oil and the injury, the process of collecting data on 
the injury and on the baseline conditions that existed before the injury 
begins.56  This has been a major undertaking for Deepwater Horizon 
responders.  Since its NRDA response began on April 20, 2010, NOAA 
has: 
[d]ocumented 2,263 visibly oiled dead birds; 2,079 visibly oiled 
live birds; 18 visibly oiled dead sea turtles; and 456 visibly oiled 
live sea turtles . . . collected 29,599 environmental samples for 
analysis . . . conducted 37,183 NRDA analyses . . . logged 
34,786 images . . . surveyed about 4,000 linear miles of shoreline 
. . . [and] deployed several hundred transmitters in wide-ranging 
species . . . to detect changes in species behavior, reproductive 
patterns and mortality.57 
Once the information is collected, trustees must begin restoration 
determinations.  These restoration options include combinations of 
                                            
 51. Id. § 990.40. 
 52. Id. § 990.41(a). 
 53. Id. § 990.44. 
 54. Id. § 990.45. 
 55. Id. § 990.50. 
 56. Id. § 990.51.  Baseline is “the condition of the natural resources and services that 
would have existed had the incident not occurred.”  Id. § 990.30. 
 57. NRDA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 1. 
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primary restoration (actions to directly restore the injured resources, 
including a natural recovery alternative) and compensatory restoration 
(“restoration activities that provide services of the same type and quality, 
and of comparable value as those injured”).58  Compensatory restoration 
must be considered if, as in the Spill, the injury involves the loss of 
natural resource services (i.e. a public beach closed due to oil) pending 
restoration.59  These options may be considered with the aim that, as a 
package, they would “make the environment and public whole.”60 
Next, trustees must determine the scale of restoration activities.61  
The process of “scaling” “refers to the process of determining, for 
identified restoration actions, the size or scale of the actions that would 
be required” to return the natural resource to baseline conditions and 
compensate the public.62  In other words, an adjustment “for the time it 
will take replacement services to fully develop.”63  When scaling the 
restoration projects, trustees must consider a “service-to-service” 
approach, which provides natural resources and services of the same type 
and quality and of comparable value as those lost, but may resort to a 
valuation approach (determined using dollars or units of resource 
service) if service-to-service is inappropriate.64  Restoration actions may 
be discounted due to natural restoration occurring in the interim or to 
uncertainty.65 
Once the trustees lay out a range of restoration alternatives they 
evaluate them based on six factors: cost, effectiveness, likelihood of 
success, extent to which the alternative will prevent future harm, multi-
resource benefits, and the effects on public health and safety.66  The 
trustees will use these criteria to develop a list of preferred restoration 
alternatives.67  If two or more alternatives are equally preferable, the 
trustees will select the most cost-effective alternative.68  Trustees may 
                                            
 58. 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(c)(2) (2010). 
 59. James S. Seevers, Jr., NOAA’s New Natural Resource Damage Assessment 
Scheme: It’s Not About Collecting Money, 53 WASH. &  LEE L. REV. 1513, 1540 (1996). 
 60. 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(a)(2) (2010). 
 61. Id. § 990.53(d). 
 62. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND RESTORATION PROGRAM, NOAA, NATURAL RESOURCE 
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT GUIDANCE DOCUMENT:  SCALING COMPENSATORY RESTORATION 
ACTIONS (OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990) vii (1997), available at 
http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/library/pdf/scaling.pdf. 
 63. Seevers, supra note 59, at 1541. 
 64. 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d) (2010); Seevers, supra note 59, at 1541. 
 65. 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(4) (2010). 
 66. Id. § 990.54(a). 
 67. Id. § 990.54(b). 
 68. Id. 
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select a pre-existing Regional Restoration Plan or other existing 
restoration project if such a plan or project is found to be the preferred 
alternative.69 
The final step in the Restoration Planning Phase is the development 
of a Draft Restoration Plan.  OPA regulations are clear that this Plan 
must be developed with an opportunity for public review and comment.70  
The Draft Restoration Plan should include: a summary of injury 
assessment procedures used; a full description of the extent of the 
injuries resulting from the incident; the goals and objectives of 
restoration; “the range of restoration alternatives considered, and a 
discussion of how such alternatives were developed”; an identification of 
the preferred alternatives; a description of responsible party involvement 
in the assessment; and “a description of monitoring for documenting 
restoration effectiveness, including performance criteria.”71  After public 
involvement, the trustees develop the Final Restoration Plan.72 
IV.  RESTORATION IMPLEMENTATION 
In the final stage of a NRDA conducted under the OPA, the Trustees 
present the Final Restoration Plan to the responsible parties, collect the 
natural resource damages, and begin carrying out restoration projects.  
As with most large-scale lawsuits, the process is laborious.  Years can 
pass between an incident and the conclusion of restoration activities, 
even for relatively minor incidents. For example, an NRDA conducted 
for a September 1998 oil spill in Lake Grand Ecaille, Louisiana, that 
exposed 1,233 acres of wetlands to oil did not result in a final 
Restoration Plan until November 2005, and the case did not settle until 
January 2006, more than seven years after the incident.73  Even when 
settlement occurs relatively quickly (within four years, typically), 
                                            
 69. Id. § 990.56(a). 
 70. Id. § 990.55(a). 
 71. Id. § 990.55(b)(1). 
 72. Id. § 990.55(d). 
 73. Damage Assessment, Remediation & Restoration Program, Case: Equinox, LA, 
NOAA, http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/southeast/equinox/index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 
2011). It is important to note that the affected marsh was “fully functioning or recovering 
to baseline function within six months after the discharge.”  FINAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 
AND RESTORATION PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: EQUINOX OIL COMPANY 
CRUDE OIL DISCHARGE, LAKE GRANDE ECAILLE, LOUISIANA, SEPTEMBER 22, 1998, at 5 
(2006), available at http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/southeast/equinox/pdf/Equinox_ 
Final_DARP_103105.pdf. 
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restoration activities may not be completed for a full decade.74  The 
Deepwater Horizon NRDA is certain to far eclipse all previous incidents 
in scale, complexity, and cost.  Creating a Restoration Plan that is able to 
“make the environment and public whole again” in a reasonable time 
will be a monumental challenge. 
The process is rather straightforward, and begins with the closing of 
the administrative record.75  Trustees cannot add documents to the 
administrative record after this point unless they: “[a]re offered by 
interested parties that did not receive . . . notice of the Draft Restoration 
Plan . . . ; [d]o not duplicate information already contained in the 
administrative record; and [r]aise significant issues regarding the Final 
Restoration Plan.”76 
Trustees must present the responsible parties with a written demand 
requiring the responsible party to either “implement the Final Restoration 
Plan subject to trustee oversight and reimburse the trustees” for their 
costs, or advance to the trustees a sum representing all trustee costs of 
assessment and restoration.77  The demand includes a request for 
reimbursement of reasonable assessment costs, the costs of any 
emergency restoration, and interest.78  The statute defines “reasonable 
assessment costs” to include “administrative costs, legal costs, and other 
costs necessary to carry out [assessments]; monitoring and oversight 
costs; costs associated with public participation; and indirect costs that 
are necessary to carry out this part.”79   
Responsible parties have ninety days to respond in writing either by 
paying assessment costs or providing binding assurance of payment.80  If 
the responsible parties do not agree to the demand within that time, 
trustees can either file a judicial action for damages or present the unpaid 
claim to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.81 
                                            
 74. Restoration was not completed for the January 1996 spill in North Cape, R.I., until 
June 2006.  Damage Assessment, Remediation & Restoration Program, Case: North 
Cape, RI, NOAA, http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/northeast/north_cape/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2011); Department of Environmental Management, State of Rhode Island, 
North Cape Oil Spill Trustees and Industry Successfully Complete North Cape Lobster 
Restoration Program, RHODEISLAND.GOV (Aug. 10, 2010), 
http://www.dem.ri.gov/news/2006/pr/0810061.htm. 
 75. 15 C.F.R. § 990.61 (2010). 
 76. Id. § 990.61(a)(1)-(3). 
 77. Id. § 990.62(a)-(b). 
 78. Id. § 990.62(e)(6). 
 79. Id. § 990.30. 
 80. Id. § 990.62(d). 
 81. Id. § 990.64(a). 
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Recovered funds are placed in a revolving trust account.82  When 
there are multiple trustees, a joint account can be created with 
enforceable agreements to govern their management.83  The funds may 
be deposited in an interest-bearing account so long as all accrued interest 
is used for restoration.84  “Trustees must maintain appropriate accounting 
and reporting procedures for the funds.”85  Once a claim is settled, 
trustees are encouraged to consider several actions to facilitate the 
implementation of restoration, including the establishment of a trustee 
committee to coordinate among affected trustees; the development of 
more detailed implementation workplans; monitoring and oversight of 
restoration; and restoration evaluation.86 
The NRDA provisions in the OPA, like all NRDA provisions, are 
specific in their intent to make natural resource restoration the only goal.  
However, there is a temptation for trustees to stray from this noble goal.  
Some argue even further that “[t]he potential [for trustees] to abuse their 
authority and breach their fiduciary duties . . . is ever present due to a 
lack of oversight and the substantial deference with which courts tend to 
accord settlements that trustees reach with PRPs.”87  We will explore 
some of these potential controversies facing the Deepwater Horizon 
NRDA in the next section. 
V.  POTENTIAL CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING RECOVERY AND 
RESTORATION 
The national media attention and public outrage that followed the 
Spill through the summer of 2010 has already waned.  It will likely be 
years before a Final Restoration Plan is complete and a settlement has 
been reached.  In the meantime, the process of selecting restoration 
options and developing the Final Restoration Plan will take place largely 
out of the public eye.  The combination of factors involved with the 
Deepwater Horizon NRDA—the large amount of money involved, the 
length of time needed to develop a restoration plan, the bureaucracy, and 
the relative difficulty in weighing environmental projects—creates a 
situation where the potential exists for trustees to stray from the explicit 
goal of an OPA NRDA: “the return of the injured natural resources . . . to 
                                            
 82. Id. § 990.65(a). 
 83. Id. § 990.65(b). 
 84. Id. § 990.65(c). 
 85. 15 C.F.R. § 990.65(e). 
 86. Id. § 990.66(a). 
 87. Murray, supra note 43, at 423. 
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baseline.”88  The rest of this Article will be spent exploring potential 
controversies that may arise as the Deepwater Horizon NRDA moves 
into its final stage, including: emergency restoration projects, legal costs, 
the degree of connection between the injured resources and restoration 
projects, and the disbursement of funds. 
A.  Emergency Restoration Projects 
There is an understandable desire to begin the Spill restoration 
activities as soon as possible.  Unlike a smaller, localized spill, the 
Deepwater Horizon Spill affected wide swaths of coastline and habitat, 
potentially threatening entire populations of wildlife.  For instance, 
during bi-annual trips along the Mississippi Flyway, millions of 
waterfowl and shorebirds rely on coastal marshes in the Gulf Coast for 
food and shelter.  Waiting to take action to either restore marshes and 
coastal areas or provide other habitat could prove devastating to 
enormous numbers of birds.   
The OPA permits trustees to conduct emergency restoration 
activities while the NRDA process is still ongoing so long as emergency 
action is required “to avoid irreversible loss of natural resources or to 
prevent or reduce any continuing danger to natural resources.”89  
Additionally, the statute requires that “[t]he action will not be undertaken 
by the lead response agency; [t]he action is feasible and likely to 
succeed,” delaying the action would result in increased damages to 
natural resources, and “[t]he costs of the action are not unreasonable.”90   
The trustees must notify responsible parties of any emergency 
actions, and invite them to participate.91  Additionally, to “the extent 
practicable,” trustees must provide the public with notice of the 
emergency action.92   “Within a reasonable time frame after completion” 
of the emergency action, the trustees must also “provide public notice of 
the justification for, [the] nature and extent of, and [the] results of the 
emergency” action.93 
Additionally, several environmental restoration and improvement 
plans already exist for the Gulf, potentially supplying trustees with a 
                                            
 88. 15 C.F.R. § 990.10. 
 89. 33 U.S.C. § 2712(j)(2) (2006).  Note that emergency restoration projects are 
separate and distinct from “clean-up” or “removal” projects taking place during the 
immediate aftermath of the incident and not covered by NRDA. 
 90. 15 C.F.R. § 990.26(a). 
 91. Id. § 990.26(c). 
 92. Id. § 990.26(d). 
 93. Id. 
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range of pre-developed restoration projects.  For example, existing plans 
for the state of Mississippi include the Mississippi Coastal Improvement 
Plan (MSCIP), a “$1.2 billion comprehensive program for coastal 
Mississippi consisting of structural, non-structural, and environmental 
project elements” related to hurricane and storm damage reduction and 
wildlife preservation;94 a program created under the Gulf of Mexico 
Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA) that conducts coastal 
protection and restoration activities;95 and projects from the Gulf of 
Mexico Alliance (GOMA), a group of Gulf state governors seeking to 
“improve the health of coastal ecosystems and economies of the Gulf.”96  
Louisiana is working to “expedite the expenditure of about $40 million 
in state and federal Coastal Wetlands Planning Protection and 
Restoration Act funds” to be put towards barrier island restoration.97  
The first Gulf restoration project to take place under the OPA’s 
“emergency restoration” provisions98 was announced in December 
2010.99  Funded initially by MDEQ (Mississippi’s lead NRDA trustee) 
and carried out by the MS Department of Wildlife, Fisheries & Parks 
(MDWFP), the project is set to improve 2,500 acres of wetlands at the 
Howard Miller and Malmaison WMAs near Rolling Fork, Mississippi.100  
It is expected that the mudflats and shallow water habitat will provide 
foraging and resting habitat for migrating shorebirds and ducks, at a cost 
of around $180,000.101  According to MDWFP officials, species such as 
northern pintail ducks will leave potentially-disturbed habitat in 
                                            
 94. MISSISSIPPI COASTAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (MSCIP), http://www.mgomc.org/ 
index.php/programs/mississippi-coastal-improvement-program-mscip (last visited Jan. 
26, 2011). 
 95. Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, 120 Stat. 3001 
(2006). 
 96. GULF OF MEXICO ALLIANCE (GOMA), http://www.mgomc.org/index.php/ 
programs/ gulf-of-mexico-alliance-goma (last visited Jan. 26, 2011). 
 97. Press Release, Governor Bobby Jindal, Governor Jindal Announces Agreement 
with BP for Seafood Safety, Coastal Restoration & Tourism Funding (Nov. 1, 2010) 
available at http://www.gov.state.la.us/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID= 
2&articleID=2550&navID=12. 
 98. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.62(e)(6) (2010). 
 99. Press Release, Miss. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, MDEQ Launches Expedited 
Restoration Project (Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://www.deq.state.ms.us/ 
newweb/MDEQPres.nsf/28ce80ddea27fe0886256b28006d8a70/47036a903e9293008625
77fb005a42d9?OpenDocument 
 100. See E-mail from Ed Penny, Waterfowl Program Coordinator, Miss. Dep’t of 
Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks, to author (Jan. 24, 2011, 11:17 EST) (on file with author). 
 101. Id. 
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southeast Louisiana to utilize newly-flooded habitat in the Mississippi 
Delta.102 
There is little precedent in the use of OPA’s emergency restoration 
regulations.103  One of the few recent examples is the aftermath of the 
April 2006 grounding of the T/V Margara near Tallaboa, Puerto Rico.  
There, the 748-foot tanker ran aground three miles offshore, injuring 
over 8,400 square meters of coral-covered seafloor and threatening to 
spill its 300,000 barrel load of fuel oil.104  After the “clean-up” work (i.e. 
floating the ship and returning it to harbor) was complete, trustees 
determined that emergency restoration was warranted because 
“[a]ntifoulant paint remnants with toxic constituents covered some 
disturbed areas . . . [l]oose and buried reef biota were at risk of imminent 
loss due to further movement or burial, remobilization of rubble, 
potential hurricanes in the 2006 season, and a potential coral bleaching 
event.”105  The public was notified via press release of the trustees’ 
decision to undertake emergency restoration.106  The process went 
smoothly, and trustees continually released information on the progress 
and completion of emergency actions, including a post-hurricane check 
                                            
 102. Id.  I feel compelled to note that only twenty-three individual ducks, and no 
northern pintails, were found dead in the wake of the Spill.  Bird Impact Data from DOI-
ERDC Database Download 14 Dec. 2010, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
http://www.fws.gov/home/dhoilspill/pdfs/Bird%20Data%20Species%20Spreadsheet%20
12142010.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). That number should be considered low, 
however, because injured ducks are more difficult to find than other species.  Bob 
Marshall, Measuring Number of Dead Ducks Caused By Spill Proves Difficulty, NEW 
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE (Oct. 3, 2010), 
http://www.nola.com/outdoors/index.ssf/2010/10/measuring_number_of_dead_ducks.ht
ml. 
 103. Both of the available examples were ship groundings in Puerto Rico, where 
emergency action was needed to stabilize broken, but still living, coral fragments. See 
generally PUBLIC NOTICE, NOTICE OF EMERGENCY RESTORATION ACTION: T/V MARGARA 
INCIDENT – APRIL 27, 2006 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.marineincidents.com/pr/margara/pdf/MARGARA%20990.26%20Notice%20
of%20ER%20-%20Final%20November%205%202006.pdf.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 2. 
 106. Press Release, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Marine Resources Division, Puerto 
Rico’s DNER and NOAA to Initiate Emergency Restoration of Coral Reef Damaged by 
Grounding of Oil Tanker (May 15, 2006), available at http://www.marineincidents.com/ 
pr/margara/pdf/FINAL%20For_Immediate_Release_may15_DRAFT.pdf. 
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on restored areas more than a year after the wreck.107  As of 2011, there 
has been no Final Restoration Plan. 
While the value and importance of emergency restoration projects is 
not doubted, the process does have the unfortunate effect of excluding 
the public.  Trustees are granted much more discretion when choosing 
projects under emergency restoration provisions, which exempt such 
projects from otherwise-required public notice and comment.108  Unlike 
the public comment periods required for draft and final Restoration 
Plans, trustees are only required to provide notice to the public—by any 
means they see fit—of the planned emergency project.109  It is not until a 
reasonable time after the project is completed that trustees must provide 
“public notice of the justification for, nature and extent of, and results of 
emergency restoration.”110  At that point, of course, the public has no 
way to prevent an unpopular project from happening.   
In addition to the exclusion of public input, oversight of emergency 
restoration actions is further limited by a relatively low burden of proof 
on the trustees.  Emergency projects are justified in part if they “prevent 
or reduce any continuing danger to natural resources”111 and if waiting to 
develop a Restoration Plan would merely “increas[e] natural resource 
damages.”112  When responding to an incident as large as the Spill, these 
low barriers may allow trustees to justify and fund projects with a less 
direct connection to the natural resources of the Gulf than is typical of an 
OPA NRDA. 
The final concern with conducting emergency restoration actions is 
that it hinders the ability of trustees to pay for damages that may not yet 
be apparent.  Many of the environmental effects of the Spill, including 
the long-term impacts of oil dispersants, are not yet known.113  Spending 
                                            
 107. See T/V Margara Ground Incident Administrative Record, 
MARINEINCIDENTS.COM, http://www.marineincidents.com/pr/margara/admin_record.html 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2011). 
 108. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 67 Fed. Reg. 61,483, 61,484 (Oct. 1, 
2002) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990).  
 109. 15 C.F.R. § 990.26(d) (2010). 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. § 990.26(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. § 990.26(a)(4). 
 113. See Bryan Walsh, Oil Spill:  Months Later, Questions Remain Over Chemical 
Dispersants, TIME (Jan. 27, 2011, 5:56 PM), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/ 
2011/01/27/oil-spill-months-later-questions-remain-over-chemical-dispersants/ 
(describing a recent study showing that chemical dispersants in the Gulf did not break 
down as quickly as scientists expected, and asking whether these dispersants were toxic 
to marine life); see also Karen A. Bjorndal et al., Better Science Needed for Restoration 
in the Gulf of Mexico, 331 SCI. 537 (2011). 
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money on emergency restoration projects now depletes funds that may be 
needed for later projects.  With the large amount of money expected for 
natural resource damages, keeping a close eye on all emergency 
restoration projects is recommended to ensure the proper use of funds. 
B.  Degree of Connection Between Injured Resources and  
Restoration Projects 
Sums recovered in an OPA NRDA are only permitted to reimburse 
costs associated with the assessment of natural resource damages, and to 
pay for the development and implementation of plans for the 
“restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition of the equivalent” 
of the injured natural resources.114  The language is deceptively simple.  
“Restore,” “rehabilitate,” “replace” or “acquire the equivalent of” are not 
further defined in the OPA or its regulations, and scant case law has not 
helped much to define the parameters in which trustees must apply 
recovered sums. 
The worry, of course, is that money recovered under a NRDA will be 
used improperly.  It is a concern nearly as old as NRD recovery itself: in 
an early CWA NRDA case, the First Circuit stated that “[t]he ultimate 
purpose of [a NRDA] should be to protect the public interest in a healthy 
functioning environment, and not to provide a windfall to the public 
treasury.”115  On the extreme end, this means using recovered sums for 
use unrelated to environmental restoration.  On the more realistic end, it 
means using recovered sums for environmental projects that have little or 
no connection to the injured resources.  Choosing restoration projects 
may be a tough decision for some trustees, especially in situations where 
the natural resources have already returned to baseline conditions after 
the initial clean-up or through natural processes while the Restoration 
plan was pending.  In those circumstances, trustees will at least recover 
NRD sums for the interim “lost use” of the resources, without a clear 
place to spend it. 
There has been litigation, however, surrounding the similar “restore, 
rehabilitate, replace or acquire the equivalent of” language in CERCLA. 
These courts, following the directive of administrative deference 
established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,116 allowed trustees wide discretion in determining how to 
pursue and use NRD sums.  In the first of these CERCLA interpretation 
                                            
 114. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(f) (2006) (referencing 33 U.S.C. § 2706(c)(1)(C)). 
 115. P.R. v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 676 (1st Cir. 1980). 
 116. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).   
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cases, Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that trustees should seek sums for the restoration of the 
injured resource rather than their lost use value, unless restoration is 
physically impossible or the cost is grossly disproportionate to the lost 
use value.117  This ruling dismantled a previous interpretation, which held 
that trustees should pursue whichever option cost less: restoration or lost 
use value. 
Courts found that Chevron deference also applied to a trustee’s 
determination of whether to use recovered sums for “restoration” or 
“rehabilitation” or “replacement” or “acquiring the equivalent of” injured 
resources.  In Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 
the state of Montana argued that because “restoration” and 
“rehabilitation” result in a “net benefit” to the public, while 
“replacement” and “acqui[sition of the] equivalent of [the injured 
natural] resources simply transfers into public ownership uninjured 
resources,” restoration and rehabilitation should be preferred over 
replacement and acquisition.118  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found 
to the contrary, ruling that Congress intended no hierarchy, and that 
trustees could choose the most appropriate projects they saw fit after 
considering benefits and costs.119 
The “restore, rehabilitate, replace, acquire” language was first 
discussed in 1980, in the context of the CWA.  In Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe 
Colocotroni,120 the First Circuit affirmed a trustee’s right to pursue the 
“acquire the equivalent of” strategy, even if that meant projects 
unconnected with the injured resources, such as “comparable lands for 
public parks or . . . reforestation of a similar proximate site.”121  
Therefore, once deciding to pursue restoration damages, “the trustee can 
decide, based on cost, whether to seek damages in an amount that can be 
used to attempt to restore the natural resources to their pre-damaged 
state, or to acquire the equivalent of the damaged natural resources by 
buying up land or by other means.”122  
Though such interpretations have not explicitly been extended to the 
OPA, the overwhelming similarities in language and intent between the 
NRDA processes included in the OPA, CERCLA and the CWA make it 
likely that the CERCLA interpretations will bear strong influence on the 
                                            
 117. Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 118. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1229 
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Rowley, supra note 17, at 478. 
 119. Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1231. 
 120. 628 F.2d 652, 676 (1980). 
 121. Rowley, supra note 17, at 479-80. 
 122. Id. at 480. 
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OPA.  If so, it means that trustees handling the Deepwater Horizon 
restoration process will have a lot of leeway in choosing restoration 
projects, even if they are far removed from the affected coastline.  As 
stated above, the first Deepwater Restoration project is taking place 
nearly 250 miles north of the Gulf Coast. 
The subtlety in the degree of connection between restoration projects 
and the injured resources can be illustrated by a case study.  In April 
2000, a leaking underground pipeline supplying the Potomac Electric 
Power Company (PEPCO) in Aquasco, MD was found to have leaked 
140,000 gallons of oil into Swanson Creek, a tributary of the Patuxent 
River.123  Severe weather quickly spread the oil, eventually fouling 
seventeen linear miles of shoreline before being contained.124  The spill 
damaged wetlands, beach shorelines, and injured a wide variety of 
wildlife, killing more than 600 ruddy ducks, 122 diamondback terrapins, 
and more than 5,000 pounds of fish and shellfish.125 
Moving more quickly than most NRDAs, PEPCO settled with the 
state of Maryland in November 2003, agreeing to pay more than $2.7 
million to implement the Restoration Plan.126  “Trustee representatives 
met with the Governor’s advisory committee, other local residents and 
scientists,” and agreed to restoration projects, which had varying degrees 
of connection to Swanson Creek and the Patuxent River.127  Three of the 
four “ecological restoration” projects had a direct, physical connection to 
the Patuxent: the creation of six acres of intertidal wetland on 
Washington Creek, a tributary of the Patuxent; the creation of a new 
beach along the river; and the creation of five acres of oyster reef 
sanctuary in the river.128   
The fourth and final project took place far from Maryland: the 
restoration of “ruddy duck nesting habitat by converting marginally 
productive agricultural land in the Prairie Pothole Region of the 
                                            
 123. Case: Chalk Point, MD, NOAA’S DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, REMEDIATION & 
RESTORATION PROGRAM, http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/northeast/chalk_point/index.html 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011).  
 124. Id. 
 125. Jonathan McKnight & Lisa Pelstring, Patuxent River Oil Spill Road to Recovery, 
MD. DEP’T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, http://www.dnr.state.md.us/naturalresource/ 
winter2003/oilspill.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). 
 126. Consent Decree at VII(A), United States v. Potomac Electric Power Company 
(2002) (No. AW 02CV4013), available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/gc-cd/chalkpoint-
cd.pdf. 
 127. McKnight & Pelstring, supra note 125. 
 128. Cleanup and Restoration Highlights at Chalk Point, Maryland, NOAA’S DAMAGE 
ASSESSMENT, REMEDIATION & RESTORATION PROGRAM, http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/ 
northeast /chalk_point/pdf/Chalk_Point_handout.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
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midwestern United States into seasonal wetlands and protecting them 
with conservation easements.”129  The spill injured more ruddy ducks 
than any other bird species, and the trustees determined that midwestern 
nesting improvements were “the only proposed project that [would] 
directly restore the injured species.”130  This project was chosen despite 
the fact that it is impossible to tell whether the ducks nesting in the 
restored habitat would, in fact, winter in Maryland.131 
What this means for Deepwater Horizon restoration projects is that 
the projects may take place far from the Gulf.   For example, the closest 
nesting habitats for the northern gannet—the third most-frequently 
injured species with 637 birds—are in Maritime Canada and the North 
Atlantic.132  Similarly, a project restoring the nesting habitat of the 
common loon (106 injured birds) could take place in northern forests 
from New England to Alaska.133  The same holds true for any species that 
was affected by the spill but may breed outside the Gulf, from the 
hundreds of bird species that use the Gulf as a migratory highway to 
bottlenose dolphins134 and Kemp’s ridley sea turtles.135 
While spending Deepwater Horizon NRDA money outside of the 
Gulf may seem contradictory, it is not outside the letter of the statute.  
NRDAs exist to restore damaged natural resources, including migratory 
wildlife.  If the best way to restore, rehabilitate, replace or acquire the 
equivalent of a migratory bird is to protect its nesting habitat, then 
                                            
 129. Id. 
 130. NOAA, FINAL RESTORATION PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE 
APRIL 7, 2000 OIL SPILL AT CHALK POINT ON THE PATUXENT RIVER, MARYLAND 56 (2002) 
available at http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/northeast/chalk_point/pdf/cp2107.pdf. 
 131. When calculating the proper scale for the project, trustees reduced the site’s 
productivity estimate by 30 percent to account for ruddy ducks that would overwinter in 
places other than the Chesapeake. Id. at 55.  Wintering ruddy ducks can be found along 
the American coast from Maryland to Washington and as far south as Central America.  
All About Birds – Ruddy Duck, THE CORNELL LAB OF ORNITHOLOGY, 
http://www.allaboutbirds.org/guide/Ruddy_Duck/id (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 132. Bird Impact Data, supra note 100; All About Birds – Northern Gannet, THE 
CORNELL LAB OF ORNITHOLOGY, http://www.allaboutbirds.org/guide/Northern_Gannet/id 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011).  
 133. All About Birds – Common Loon, THE CORNELL LAB OF ORNITHOLOGY, 
http://www.allaboutbirds.org/guide/Common_Loon/id (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 134. Bottlenose dolphins live in temperate and tropical oceans around the world.  
Bottlenose Dolphin, THE AMERICAN CETACEAN SOCIETY, http://www.acsonline.org/ 
factpack/btlnose.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
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trustees are well within their right to do so, regardless of where that 
habitat is.  Note that Deepwater Horizon trustees will still have plenty of 
opportunities to protect nesting habitat in oil damaged areas; for instance, 
the two most-injured species, laughing gull (3,354 birds) and brown 
pelican (932 birds), both nest in the Gulf.136  
Further enabling potential abuse by trustees is their ability to settle 
with PRPs at any time, even before the completion of the assessment.137  
The political pressure that may exist when a PRP is so important to a 
local economy, as BP is to that of the Gulf Coast, may result in a 
settlement lower than the estimated cost of damaged natural resources.  
Such settlements are difficult to challenge in court.138  The OPA is clear, 
though, that settlements must be “fair, reasonable, and in the public 
interest, with particular consideration of the adequacy of the settlement 
to restore, replace, rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent of the injured 
natural resources and services.”139 
The public should carefully watch the development of the Deepwater 
Horizon restoration plan.  While it is clear that the overwhelming body 
of funds will be used to restore natural resources located in the Gulf, the 
potential exists for enterprising governments to lobby for NRDA money 
to rehabilitate wildlife in their own states or countries.  While this may 
cause an uproar in Gulf states, it is not contrary to the goals of the OPA.  
However, making sure that money is spent responsibly and beneficially, 
for all projects, requires public vigilance and participation. 
C.  Disbursement of Funds 
Yet another challenge presented by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
lies with the sheer geographical scope of the spill.  Spanning five state 
jurisdictions as well as federal waters, this particular spill raises unique 
considerations of how the NRDA funds, once calculated, should be 
distributed throughout the affected areas.  The OPA does not speak to 
specific apportionment among the parties, but rather tracks the severity 
of harm.140  As previously discussed, trustees have considerable latitude 
                                            
 136. Bird Impact Data, supra note 100. 
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to fund projects outside the impacted area in certain circumstances.141  
However, each state would like to see as much of the NRDA funds as 
possible return to its state. As a result, the Gulf states have essentially 
begun competing with each other over NRDA funds.  
Even with the NRDA process in the beginning stages, various states 
are already posturing over what percentage of the funds each state should 
receive. Strategies vary by state. Initially, all five states were negotiating 
interim payments for both natural resource and economic damages with 
BP.142  However, this process fell apart for Alabama last fall when the 
state filed a lawsuit against BP and Transocean, seeking both economic 
and natural resources damages.143  Thereafter, BP refused to issue interim 
payments to Alabama, citing the pending litigation.144  Louisiana, on the 
other hand, received millions of dollars from BP for restoration projects 
in late 2010.145  More recently, Louisiana has requested an emergency 
payment for oyster bed restoration designed to provide Louisiana 
oystermen with immediate relief.146  Mississippi and Florida have 
pursued negotiations and interim funding, although both states have 
intimated their willingness to pursue litigation if necessary.147  Like 
Louisiana, Mississippi recently began work on an emergency restoration 
project aimed at duck habitat restoration in Rolling Fork, Mississippi.148  
Likely, these interim restoration payments will correspondingly offset 
any final restoration payment by BP. 
In addition to state competition for restoration funds, several 
environmental groups are seeking restoration funding for Gulf wildlife 
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through an Endangered Species Act (ESA) lawsuit filed against BP.149  
While this litigation is brought under the ESA, much of the requested 
relief mirrors that which NRDA is designed to address.150  Specifically, 
litigants seek, among other things, “restoration of ecosystem 
components” and “a permanent endowment dedicated to the long-term 
restoration.”151  If these litigants are successful, the correlation between 
NRDA funding and funds established through this litigation will remain 
unclear.  Arguably, the sought-after relief is, in many ways, duplicative 
to restoration through the NRDA process, which is expressly prohibited 
by the OPA.152 
D.  Legal Costs 
Navigating the NRDA process for State Trustees can be a potentially 
unwieldy and consuming process.  For a variety of reasons, a state may 
retain outside legal counsel with specialized expertise to represent its 
interests in the process.153  As set forth below, the OPA allows states to 
recoup legal costs incurred during the NRDA process.154  But what 
happens when a state contracts with outside counsel on a contingency fee 
basis?  
Through regulation, legal costs under the OPA are defined as “the 
costs of attorney actions performed for the purpose of assessment or 
developing a restoration plan” in accordance with the NRDA process.155  
When attorneys’ actions fall within specified criteria, those actions “are 
deemed assessment costs.”156  For attorneys’ fees to constitute 
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assessment costs, the attorneys’ actions must 1) comprise assessment or 
restoration planning activities under OPA section 1006(c); 2) occur 
before litigation is filed on behalf of a trustee to recover damages; and 3) 
be performed by an attorney working on behalf of a trustee agency rather 
than a prosecutorial agency.157  If the action fails to meet all three 
criteria, a trustee must justify “why the action was not performed for the 
primary purpose of furthering litigation in order to support a 
characterization of the action as an assessment action.”158  Common 
assessment actions include, but are not limited to, advising trustees on 
the requirements of the OPA, preparing public notices and maintaining 
administrative records, and preparing binding agreements between the 
parties.159  In other words, outside counsel’s actions incurred in the 
furtherance of litigation, particularly on behalf of an attorney general, 
cannot be recovered as assessment costs under NRDA. 
As noted by others in the context of the CERCLA, “contingent fee 
[natural resource damage] cases raise novel legal issues.”160  Like the 
OPA, CERCLA allows for the recovery of natural resource damages.161  
Once recovered, CERCLA expressly requires that funds be available “for 
use only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such natural 
resources.”162  The OPA similarly restricts the use of NRDA funds to 
costs incurred in the damage assessment itself, in the development of a 
restoration plan, and in the implementation of corresponding activities to 
achieve “restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition of the 
equivalent, of the natural resources.”163  The question becomes whether 
paying outside firms on a contingency basis violates the restrictions on 
use of NRDA funds.  
Courts have yet to consider this question in the context of the OPA, 
but states employing this arrangement under CERCLA have generated 
substantial controversy.164  Criticisms include assertions that the 
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arrangement violates the public trust doctrine and state fiduciary 
duties.165  Even where state law permits contingency fee arrangements, 
judicial interpretations under CERCLA suggest that the OPA preempts 
any state statutory authorization for contingency fee payments.166  
Considering similar language under CERCLA, the Tenth Circuit held 
that the statutory natural resource damage scheme “preempts any state 
remedy designed to achieve something other than the restoration, 
replacement, or acquisition of the equivalent of a contaminated natural 
resource.”167  The court expressly rejected the use of natural resource 
damage monies for the payment of attorneys’ fees.168  The court did, 
however, suggest that use of monies received specifically as awards of 
state law claims, such as negligence and nuisance, would not be 
preempted, but only to the extent that those monies were separate from 
natural resource damage monies.169  If the Tenth Circuit’s analysis is 
applied to OPA NRDA litigation, states may wish to reconsider 
employing outside counsel on contingency fee arrangements.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
There is little doubt that the OPA’s NRDA provisions will play a 
major role in helping natural resources injured by the Spill return to 
health.  The development of NRDA provisions is remarkable because 
they provide damages to the resources themselves—victims that are 
otherwise unable to advocate for themselves.  However, including 
natural resource damage provisions in the statute is only the first step in 
ensuring that natural resources are restored.  As the owners and 
beneficiaries of natural resources, the public must remain involved and 
vigilant throughout the NRDA process to ensure that the money is being 
used properly, with particular attention paid to the use of emergency 
funds, the degree of connection between the injured resources and 
restoration projects, the disbursement of funds, and legal fees.  If proper 
care is paid, there is no reason that the Deepwater Horizon NRDA cannot 
reduce the environmental effects of that terrible spill to memories.  
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